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Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and
Consumer Protection
Joshua Fairfield
Abstract
Trustless public ledgers (“TPLs”)—the technology underneath
Bitcoin—do more than just create online money. The technology
permits people to directly exchange money for what they want, with
no intermediaries, such as credit card companies. Contract law is
the law of bargained-for exchange, so a technology that enables
direct exchange online will change the reality of online contracting.
The current problem with consumer contracting online is that
courts and companies have collaborated to create an online system
in which consumers cannot bargain. Under the current regime,
consumers have no choice but to click the “I Accept” button. Online,
contract law is not the law of bargained-for exchange; it has become
the law of company-dictated exchange. Smart contracts—
automated computer programs able to execute trades through
TPLs—may offer a solution. This brief Essay explores the
possibilities of smart contracts and their potential to correct the
badly off-course law of online contract.
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I. Introduction
Trustless public ledgers are online lists, maintained by no one
and available to everyone, that are maintained by a consensus
protocol.1 For example, imagine a list on a whiteboard in a
dormitory floor, keeping track of who paid for pizza last time. The
advantages to such a list—public availability and ease of editing—
are clear. The disadvantages are equally clear. Someone might
attempt to edit the list to their personal advantage. A solution that
immediately suggests itself is that the dorm RA might be entrusted
to keep the list. Yet then there is the concern that the RA may
make a mistake, or be unavailable over the weekend, or be
untrustworthy and edit the list to benefit himself. What is needed
is a public ledger that is constrained by rules of consensus to
prevent individuals from modifying the list to their exclusive
benefit. That is the central technology underlying Bitcoin: the
“trustless public ledger” (TPL).2 The ledger is public because
anyone can download a copy.3 It is trustless because the underlying
mathematical rules make it extraordinarily difficult to unilaterally
change the list in the face of an opposing consensus.4 It is
1. See Barrett Sheridan, Bitcoins: Currency of the Geeks, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 16, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/
content/11_26/b4234041554873.htm (last visited July 31, 2014) (describing the
communal verification process for Bitcoin transactions) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Paul H. Farmer, Jr., Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire
and the Need for Legal Innovation, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 85, 89 (2014) (explaining
how public Bitcoin recordkeeping permits transactions without third party
oversight).
3. See id. (describing the type of electronic ledger used in Bitcoin
transactions); Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital
Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111,
116 (2012) (describing the public nature of Bitcoin transactions).
4. See Farmer, supra note 2, at 89 (describing the “cryptographic proof” of
transactions maintained in the ledger, which are designed to remove third
parties’ ability to manipulate transactions).
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disintermediated because no single entity can control or
manipulate the list.5 Entrepreneurs and analysts agree that
TPLs—of which Bitcoin is merely one example6—can potentially
restructure the power relationship between consumers and
intermediaries online.7 Because the Bitcoin block-chain protocol is
strongly disintermediated, intermediaries lose some of the pride of
place that they enjoyed in the online economy as it evolved over
the past twenty years.8
The rhetoric of Bitcoin enthusiasts is overblown, but contains
a kernel of truth. Although TPLs will not cause internet
intermediaries to wither away, they will cause a shift in the
balance of power between consumers and intermediaries.9
5. See id. at 89–90 (explaining how each transaction requires information
(the public and private keys) from both the buyer and seller, which is recorded in
the transaction data and cannot be altered by one person).
6. See John Evans, Bitcoin 2.0: Unleash the Sidechains, TECHCRUNCH (Apr.
19, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/19/bitcoin-2-0-unleash-the-sidechains/
(last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (“Bitcoin is both the first and most successful blockchain
application, but there are many, many other ‘cryptocurrencies,’ known as
‘altcoins.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet
Holds Itself Together, and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343,
347–48 (2008) (providing one example of the disruptive power of public ledgers
that allows capital to be used to develop new services such as the elimination of
transaction costs); Perianne Boring, BitGo Raises $12Mil, Draws Attention of
Institutional
Investors,
FORBES
(June
16,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/perianneboring/2014/06/16/bitgo-raises-12mildraws-attention-of-institutional-investors/ (last visited July 31, 2014) (discussing
one innovation, multi-signature technology (“Multisig”), which gives parties using
Bitcoin recourse in the case of the other party’s nonperformance) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); John Villasenor, Could ‘Multisig’ Help Bring
Consumer Protection to Bitcoin Transactions?, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2014/03/28/could-multisig-help-bringconsumer-protection-to-bitcoin-transactions/ (last visited July 31, 2014)
(describing Multisig’s effects on markets using Bitcoin) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See Kaplanov, supra note 3, at 116 (describing public ledger systems,
specifically Bitcoin transactions, as “free of third party presence—whether that
third party is a government, bank, payment network, or clearinghouse. . . . [This]
allows parties to the transaction to deal directly with one another without a third
party authorizing the transaction”).
9. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing one innovative
service, Multisig, where third parties will continue to be relevant because they
serve as custodians, ensuring both parties to a transaction perform their
obligations).
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Consumers may still find it useful to use bank-like institutions.
Yet they need not. The trustless ledger system permits them to
transfer and hold money in large amounts on their own account.10
The question is whether TPLs will have a similar effect in other
areas of law outside of the financial sector.11
What has until now flown under the radar is the fact that
Bitcoin is merely the tip of an iceberg. Given the speed with which
new business models are developing around crypto-currencies and
trustless technologies,12 it is time to start looking past routine
financial applications of such ledgers as currencies. They do much
more. TPLs permit parties not only to hold digital assets of value
without banking intermediaries; they also permit parties to
transfer digital assets of value directly, on their own terms,
without any institution acting as an exchange intermediary.13
Smart contracts—automated programs that transfer digital
assets within the block-chain upon certain triggering
conditions14—represent a new and interesting form of organizing
10. See Rob Wile, Satoshi’s Revolution: How the Creator of Bitcoin May Have
Stumbled Onto Something Much, Much Bigger, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-future-of-the-blockchain-2014-4 (last visited
Aug. 4, 2014) (describing how block-chain security permits individuals to verify
transactions and property’s existence, therefore assuring market participants of
the safety of the block-chain-based digital marketplace) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See id. (speculating as to whether groups such as BitShares and
Ethereum will succeed in efforts to implement block-chain technology in areas
such as stock exchanges, voting, and music distribution).
12. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 16–18
(2012), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210
en.pdf (describing the plethora of virtual currencies from the Linden Dollar to
Bitcoin and the services that accompany them, including Paypal).
13. See Wile, supra note 10 (“[TPLs have] no intermediaries, therefore
there’s really nothing to stop a computer from just connecting to the Internet and
taking part all by itself. All you need to do to instantiate a Bitcoin wallet is
generate a large random number.” (quoting an interview with Mike Hearn));
supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing public ledgers as being virtually
free of intermediaries).
14. See David Morris, Bitcoin Is Not Just Digital Currency. It’s Napster for
Finance., FORTUNE (Jan. 21, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/01/21/bitcoin-is-notjust-digital-currency-its-napster-for-finance/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (defining
smart contracts and providing examples such as a car that would automatically
disable itself if loan payments were not made) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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contractual activity. If financial transactions can be freed of banks
as intermediaries, then contracts can be freed of courts as
intermediaries. This solves a longstanding puzzle and problem of
e-commerce: courts’ longstanding refusal to enforce contract terms
proffered by consumers.15 If courts will not protect consumers,
robots will.16 Consumers can use automated consumer-grade
purchasing agents, tied to Bitcoin wallets and preprogrammed
with consumer preferences, to reclaim their ability to negotiate in
online transactions.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part II briefly discusses how
TPLs disintermediate online exchange, and further describes how
exchange disintermediation can lead to a revitalization of
consumers’ ability to offer, enter into, and enforce contracts online.
Part III discusses the phenomenon of online consumer contract
exclusion, and explores why consumer-proffered contract terms are
denied enforcement in e-commercial arrangements. Part IV
focuses on how Bitcoin-fueled smart contracts can be used by
automated software agents to protect consumers’ identity from
theft and automatically enforce their contractual preferences. Part
V discusses and engages the standard challenges to consumeroriented theories of online contract.

15. See, e.g., James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161,
167–69 (2013) (noting that the modern marketplace relies on competition to weed
out onerous contracting terms, rather than consumer negotiation); id. at 170–80
(explaining why the idealized compensatory model does not work with boilerplate
contract language in the modern marketplace); Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W.
McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How the Law
Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 23
(2011) (explaining how online service providers often do “not allow the consumer
the same luxury of changing the contract at will, but instead retains the
unilateral modification power exclusively for itself”); id. at 23–28 (exploring the
legal sacrifices that consumers make when contracting with online service
providers—a completely asymmetric contract relationship); see also Joshua
Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1071–72 (2005) (describing
traditional limits on contract enforceability, including limits on use and lockingin low-value property uses).
16. See Morris, supra note 14 (explaining that, because Bitcoin is entirely
distributed, the system permits “loans without banks, contracts without lawyers,
and stocks without brokers, executed and recorded across hundreds of servers at
all corners of the earth”).
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II. Radical Disintermediation

TPLs disintermediate exchange.17 They permit parties to
transmit money or other valuable online assets to one another
securely and cheaply, without relying on any centralized entity to
curate a database of who owns what.18 Previous systems for digital
money have relied on a centralized list curator to control the list of
which assets are ascribed to whom.19 Thus, to move a digital asset
from Person A to B, one must contact the list curator, and have
that person change the entry “Person A owns asset X,” to “Person
B owns asset X.” The cost of the list curator and the chance that
that curator may fail, mishandle, or manipulate the list, are all
costs that must be borne by such systems.
TPL systems propose a solution to the problem of expensive
intermediaries. They offer a consensus system for maintaining a
decentralized list of who owns what.20 The coordination problem is
addressed by a proof-of-work system, which makes it expensive
and difficult to compromise the list.21 This system scales elegantly:
the more value that comes into the system, and the more people
that seek it, the harder the system is to compromise.22
A full discussion of the mechanics of Bitcoin is well beyond the
scope of this short Essay, and much has already been written.
What is important to take away is that Bitcoin innovates in two
ways. It is a method for tracking who owns which property
17. See Kaplanov, supra note 3, at 125–26 (explaining Bitcoin’s ability to
eliminate intermediaries as necessary parties to transactions).
18. See id. at 127–28 (discussing how Bitcoins are used to get around
traditional methods of blocking money transfers, and how some people treat
Bitcoins as an investment).
19. Cf. supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing one innovative
service, Multisig, where third parties will continue to be relevant because they
serve as custodians, ensuring both parties to a transaction perform their
obligations).
20. See Evans, supra note 6 (describing TPLs and block-chain technology as
“a peer-to-peer network . . . used to codify and cryptographically verify
transactions, without any central authority”).
21. See Morris, supra note 14 (explaining the proof-of-work system as
constant vetting of transactions by a “vast network of ‘miners’ rewarded for their
maintenance work with a stream of bitcoin”).
22. See Sheridan, supra note 1 (illustrating the miners’ work and how larger
numbers and processing power allow for a more secure TPL).
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interests without a centralized intermediary, and it is a method for
transferring that property directly, peer to peer.23 The second
characteristic has further ramifications. If consumers can now
make disintermediated property or currency exchanges, then they
can begin to make disintermediated contractual arrangements.24
If consumers can hold money without banks, they can enforce
contracts without courts.25 If consumers can offer their own
standardized contractual agreements, then they may be able to
undo the radical disenfranchisement of consumers in online
contracting environments.
III. Consumer Contract Exclusion
This Essay supports its argument that courts prevent
consumers from enforcing expressed online contractual terms
through a thought experiment. Consider and compare the
following scenarios. First, a consumer logs onto a corporate web
server, seeking to buy a widget. She encounters there contractual
terms and conditions, which she clicks through without reading
(although she has a rough idea what is in them), and concludes a
purchase. The contract is enforceable according to its terms.26
Second, a software agent logs into a corporate web server. The
computer program encounters various terms and conditions, either
because of an electronic data interchange27 format (for business-to23. See Morris, supra note 14 (illustrating both direct property transfers and
the public tracking of transfers within a TPL network).
24. See id. (describing property relationships that would be enabled with
Bitcoin technology, including managing real-world leases and entering into
mortgages and purchase contracts).
25. See id. (giving one example: the ability to enforce car payments).
26. See Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (stating
that every court that has considered the validity of shrink-wrap contracts has
held them valid and binding); Rachel Conklin, Be Careful What You Click For: An
Analysis of Online Contracting, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 325, 327 (2008)
(“Clickwrap contracts have been accepted as valid by United States courts
virtually every time they have been challenged.”).
27. An electronic data interchange is “the computer-to-computer exchange of
business documents in a standard electronic format between business partners.”
What
is
EDI
(Electronic
Data
Interchange)?,
EDI
BASICS,
http://www.edibasics.com/what-is-edi/#sthash.pMY8jxXo.dpuf (last visit Aug. 29,
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business purchases), or because it runs into some other machinereadable text, such as a robots.txt file (for web crawlers and
indexing agents). The machine concludes a purchase. The contract
is enforceable according to its terms.28
Third, a consumer’s software agent logs into a corporate web
server. The consumer’s software agent offers specific contractual
terms stating the terms on which the consumer is willing to deal.
For example, the consumer may have informed the web server that
she is only willing to deal with that server if the server respects
her desire not to sell her personal data, by setting a “do not track”
flag.29 The corporate web server, having been apprised of those
terms but programmed to take no notice of them, concludes a
purchase anyway. The consumer contract is not enforceable
according to its terms.30
Why? Somewhere in the shift from dickered, black letter lawnegotiated contracting to non-dickered, standardized, massmarket consumer contracting, the ability of consumers to negotiate
their own contract terms vanished.31 Under sustained assault by
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). A “computer-tocomputer” transaction means that “EDI documents can flow straight through to
the appropriate application on the receiver’s computer (e.g., the Order
Management System) and processing can begin immediately” without involving
paper or people. Id.
28. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT § 719.310 (2001) (“A contract may be formed by
the interaction of electronic agents of the parties, even if no natural person was
aware of or reviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms and
agreements.”).
29. A “do not track” flag is a browser setting that allows consumers “to choose
whether they want to allow websites to collect information about their Internet
activity and use it to deliver targeted advertisements and for other purposes.” Do
Not Track, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/protecting-consumer-privacy/do-not-track (last visited Aug. 30, 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. See Lemley, supra note 26, at 464 (describing the battle of the forms and
noting that when a contract features conflicting forms, the conflicting terms are
read out of the contract unless one party has demonstrated a willingness to forgo
the deal over that term); Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap
Agreements All They Are Wrapped Up To Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173,
201 (2007) (arguing that implied consent to privacy terms can be created by
browse-wrap agreements).
31. See Conklin, supra note 26, at 329–30 (explaining that, when
interpreting browse-wrap contracts, courts generally find that a user’s acceptance
is implied by his or her use of a website); Lemley, supra note 26, at 470–71
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courts and legal theorists, a consumer’s ability to proffer legally
binding
online
contractual
arrangements
has
almost
disappeared.32
This state of affairs is fact, but has no basis in law. Courts do
not enforce consumer-proffered online terms as enforceable
contractual terms,33 but they also do not admit that this is what
they are doing.34 Courts instead exclude the consumer preference
from the four corners of the online agreement.35 What the company
wrote is “the contract,” and the expression of consumer preference
is simply not part of that contract.36 Courts manipulate the
contours of the contractual agreement to exclude expressions of
consumer preference in online agreements.37 If, however,
consumers were able to somehow express their preferences
unmistakably within the contours of what courts consider to be the
online agreement, then courts would have no choice but to
recognize consumer-proffered online contract terms.38 Instead of
just clicking “I Agree,” consumers could actually contract again.
(explaining that judicial interpretation of browse-wrap contracts is based on
traditional trespass: domain owners need only give notice that “trespassing” on
their website is conditioned by contract terms in order to enforce their property
rights).
32. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (demonstrating how, when a
website user has a form contract or terms that are not explicitly accepted by the
other party and the website user continues to use the website, the user’s terms
are read out of the contract and are not binding).
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that consumerproffered online contract terms are unenforceable under current “battle of the
forms” jurisprudence).
34. See infra note 35 (describing the factors courts purportedly consider).
35. See Rambarran, supra note 30, at 186 (describing three factors courts
look at when analyzing browse-wrap contracts: notice, consent, and whether the
substantive requirements for the particular terms were met).
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that consumerproffered online contract terms are read out of a contract when there is a battle
of the forms).
37. See Lemley, supra note 26, at 472–77 (describing courts’ willingness to
enforce browse-wrap terms against business consumers and concluding that
courts are more willing to enforce retroactive amendments to contracts without
consent and other anti-consumer terms in the business-to-business context).
38. See id. at 464 (arguing that a parallel interpretive canon to the “battle of
the forms” for online business-to-business contracting would allow additional
consumer power).
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This is why e-commerce websites are so carefully engineered
to limit any consumer expression of preference beyond quantity.
When one shops at Amazon, one may pick the number of items
shipped, but nothing else.39 There is no drop-down box for
consumer terms provided.40 Consumers are constrained by the
form of the webpage from offering other terms, such as
reservations of rights and warranties.41 Consider the routine
online disclaimer of warranties, which has eviscerated consumer
protections offered by the Uniform Commercial Code.42 Some
consumers may wish to pay more and refuse the disclaimer of
warranty. Indeed, the Code system is so structured that if one
party disclaims warranties, and the other requires those
warranties, then the warranties exist.43 Yet in the online context,
such a disagreement over warranties cannot happen.44 There is no
warranty drop-down box.
IV. Automated Agents and Consumer Protection
What is needed is a format in which consumers can express
their preferences to automated agents (often termed “bots” or
“robots,” despite the agents’ lack of physicality), and then expect
their preferences to be enforced. If courts discriminate against
consumer preferences in online contracting, consumers will need
39. See, e.g., The Sopranos: The Complete Series, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/Sopranos-Complete-Various/dp/B006CR2OOA/ref=sr_
1_1?s=movies-tv&ie=UTF8&qid=1408632827&sr=1-1&keywords=sopranos+com
plete+series (last visited Aug. 21, 2014) (allowing a customer to choose the
quantity she would like to order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
40. See, e.g., id. (providing a single drop-down box for quantity).
41. See, e.g., id. (providing no functionality for consumers to propose
additional terms).
42. See Rambarran, supra note 30, at 187–90 (discussing warranties and
other consumer protection devices articulated in the Uniform Commercial Code).
43. See Lemley, supra note 26 (“[T]he Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
resolved this ‘battle of the forms’ by adopting a compromise: if the terms conflict,
neither party’s terms become part of the contract unless a party demonstrates its
willingness to forego the deal over it.” (citing U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2003)).
44. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (describing consumers’
lack of options for online contracting).
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to turn to automated agents to protect their contractual
preferences.
Automated consumer-grade purchasing software is already in
common circulation. Consider eBay “sniping” programs. These are
programs that are set to auto-bid on an item, up to a certain price,
with certain parameters involving speed of bid and time interval
between bids. The purpose of the sniping program is to wait to bid
up an item until the time of the item has nearly expired. EBay
offers its own bid-up program, permitting buyers to make
automated bids up to a given level, to resist sniping from
outsiders.45 Thus, these systems are not only extant, they are
commonplace.
What is not yet commonplace is the use of automated
consumer purchasing software on an internet-wide scale. One
reason for this is the limits and variability of payment options. It
is possible to find a program that could be given a consumer’s
credit-card information and told to hunt for good deals, and such
programs have indeed been floated. But the variation in payment
formats and the cost and complexities of payment have stymied
widespread use of consumer-grade automation software. The early
1990s hesitation to entrust websites with credit card data has
become an early 2010s hesitation to entrust automation software
with financial information. This is all the more the case because of
identity fraud.
Yet, identity fraud is a byproduct of the locked-down financial
e-commercial infrastructure within which consumers have been,
until now, constrained to operate. Until recently, a party who
wishes to pay for something online must reveal her personal
information. This is because the nature of the transaction is
contract-based, not property-based. An online payment is not a
transfer of money from one person to another. It is, properly
speaking, a chain of promises to pay. The credit card company
settles with the bank of the vendor and receives payment in
monthly installments from the consumer. For such a chain to
function, each party must know the identity of the other parties in
45. See Automatic Bidding, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/
automatic-bidding.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2014) (describing eBay’s automatic
bidding system, in which a customer may set a maximum bid and eBay will
automatically increase the customer’s bid to maintain the highest bid up to the
chosen maximum bid) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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the chain. A future promise to pay on the part of entity X is useless
unless one knows X’s identity.
Crypto-currency transactions, by contrast, permit consumers
to buy items online without exposing their personal information. A
consumer can transfer digital cash directly, instead of constructing
a chain of identity supporting a promise of future payment. The
vendor does not need to know who the buyer is, merely that the
buyer can pay the amount of digital cash required. Consider the
recent massive loss of credit card information by Target and other
retailers during the 2013 holiday season.46 Had those transactions
been in Bitcoin, the consumers would have been as safe from
identity theft as if they had paid in cash.
Automated software agents can be programmed with their
own Bitcoin wallets, and can release funds, or not, according to
consumer-set parameters. If companies do not satisfy the
parameters, the deal does not go through. Consider a simple smart
contract that a consumer instructs to buy a toaster. It is
programmed to seek a single unit of the item, at the lowest price,
and subject to a reservation of all rights and remedies, including
all standard consumer warranties. The agent is connected to a
Bitcoin wallet, and can therefore pay for the item without releasing
the consumer’s identity into the wild. Indeed, depending on the
nature of the transaction and the need for shipping addresses, it is
entirely possible that the agent can buy and sell on the consumer’s
behalf without providing any information about the consumer to
the company at all.
V. Challenges to Consumer-Originated Smart Contracts
There are several challenges to this conception of smart
contracts, automated agents, and consumer protection. Because
these theoretical challenges represent the current received legal
wisdom, they are briefly addressed and engaged here.
46. See Target Confirms Unauthorized Access to Payment Card Data in U.S.
Stores, TARGET (Dec. 19, 2013), http://pressroom.target.com/news/targetconfirms-unauthorized-access-to-payment-card-data-in-u-s-stores (last visited
August 14, 2014) (confirming unauthorized access to more than forty million
credit and debit card accounts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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First, and most pragmatically, the technology is not shovelready. As futurist Clay Shirky has noted, technological revolutions
do not get interesting socially until they are boring
technologically.47 Attempts to package and deliver consumer
contractual preferences have foundered on whether the technology
can operate smoothly.
Here, however, TPLs can play a large role in simplifying and
enabling consumer-driven automated agents. The value
proposition of TPLs is complicated, and the means by which the
ledger itself is secured is a matter of moderately complex
mathematics and some game theory. Yet the use of cryptocurrencies themselves is simple and could be even simpler. In
particular, TPLs completely remove a major source of consumer
hesitancy and complexity by eliminating the need for consumers to
entrust automated agents with their personal information. A
consumer setting up an autonomous agent would not even need to
designate with whom the contract would be concluded. A price, a
quantity, and warranties would do. The consumer can protect
against software malfunction by funding the agent with limited
amounts. There is only so much damage the agent can do.
A second challenge to consumer-oriented contract approaches
is the claim that companies will ignore consumer-proffered
contract terms and that courts will enable them to continue doing
so.48 This is a non-trivial concern, yet there is hope. Cryptocurrency-fueled smart contracts offer a digital cash-on-thebarrelhead transaction. For a range of transactions, the consumer
is protected. Her personal information is safe. If the company does
not offer what the consumer seeks, the agent does not act, and the
contract is not concluded. This leaves as a risk only those
transactions in which a company has made representations to an
agent on which the company then reneges. Here there is some hope
47. Clay Shirky, Transcript—How Social Media Can Make History, TED
(June 2009), http://www.ted.com/talks/clay_shirky_how_cellphones_twitter_
facebook_can_make_history/transcript (last visited Aug. 15, 2014) (noting that, in
the context of the social media revolution, online “tools don’t get socially
interesting until they get technologically boring”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
48. See supra notes 31–38 and accompanying text (demonstrating how this
concern arises under the current legal regime of the battle of the forms).
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that a court will apply more traditional, dickered, black letter law
to enforce the consumer-proffered contract. There is at least some
chance of convincing courts that the seller has accepted the buyer’s
offer, rather than the other way around.
A third challenge comes from theorists who are concerned
about minimizing overall transaction costs for the online economy.
These theorists see contract standardization as positive because it
reduces information costs, and they see companies as a better
source for standardization than consumers.49 The concern is that
if companies are forced to respond to thousands of one-off unique
consumer contractual proposals, they will not be able to create the
economies of contractual scale that are necessary to reduce costs.50
These theorists are half right. Standardization is important to
reduce transaction costs. Indeed, standardization is necessary in
order to create contracts that are sufficiently standardized to
become machine-readable. Where the information-cost theorists go
wrong is in assuming that companies are a better source of
standardized deals than are consumers. Companies create prolix
and confusing online contracts. Consumers merely want the
standard deal, with no complex reservations. A pro-consumer
standardized contract is simple: all remedies and rights are
reserved. A corporate-drafted contract, even for a relatively
straightforward consumer purchase, can run into tens of pages.
Consumers minimize complexity. Companies minimize their legal
risk, even (perhaps especially) when doing so increases complexity.
Companies may of course refuse to do business with consumeroriginated automated agents, just as companies may refuse to
accept crypto-currencies. Yet this is very unlikely. Consider that
companies already retool—indeed, optimize—their websites at
significant cost to accommodate automated agents, such as
49. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 834–35 (2006) (arguing
that one-sided, seller-oriented form contracts actually minimize transaction costs
because of the seller’s inability to determine, ex ante, which consumers would
abuse the contractual relationship without harsh standardized terms); James
Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 205 n.114 (2013)
(providing a list of authors and authorities in support of this proposition).
50. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 442 (2002) (arguing “the
aggregate decisions of many consumers can pressure businesses into providing
an efficient set of contract terms in their standard forms”).
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Google’s web crawlers. Those robots are consumer agents by
extension: they gather information, which is placed at consumers’
disposal. To a large extent, the search side of the online purchasing
equation has already been automated. What remains is to
automate the purchase itself, which is what crypto-currencybacked smart contracts can do.
VI. Conclusion
Currency uses of TPLs are merely the first wave of the
technology. The math is out of the bag. While TPLs began by
proposing a solution disintermediating online property, that
disintermediation is likely to affect other areas of law. One area
that has long been ripe for reform is consumer contracting. To date,
mass-market contracting has rested on the principle that
companies can, through their design of the technological
contracting process, exclude expressions of consumer preference,
and that courts will tacitly support this effort by excluding
consumer terms from the four corners of the electronic contracts
courts enforce.
Smart contracts will test the poorly conceived legal
foundations of the current mass-market consumer-term-exclusion
regime. Crypto-currency-backed autonomous agents can offer to
buy items without any need to pass on the consumer’s identity or
payment information. Such agents can further offer digital cashon-the-barrelhead contracts. It will be much more difficult for a
vendor who has accepted such a deal to then later assert that it is
not bound by the contractual terms offered by the agent.
Disintermediation has chain effects. Although the debate
surrounding Bitcoin and similar crypto-currencies has almost
entirely focused on the effect of such systems on the payments and
banking infrastructures, there will be more, and more important,
changes that will result from the placing of online financial control
back into consumers’ hands. Once smart contracts answerable to
consumers alone are doing the shopping, vendors will either have
to respect consumer-proffered contractual demands, or petition
courts to continue to undermine consumer contracting power
online. Both will happen, but the former is more likely. Those

50

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2014)

companies who choose to challenge, rather than respect, consumerdriven smart contract purchases will simply not get paid.

